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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the ‘governance turn’ in the development policies of the European Union, 
represented in particular by the adoption of the ‘European Consensus on Development’ in 2005. The 
main assumption inherent in the EU approach to development is that the quality of governance in 
developing countries is a crucial (co-) determinant of development outcomes. The analysis concerns 
the allocation of funds (over €50 billion during the 2007-13 period) through the EU’s main policy 
instruments: the European Development Fund, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument, and the Development Cooperation Instrument. The paper attempts to establish whether 
any dominant explanation, or combination of explanations, given in the literature on development 
assistance, is able to account for the allocation of those parts of the funds that are meant to be spent on 
governance reform. Three explanatory models of development assistance are tested, revolving around 
notions of normative power Europe, donor interest and recipient need. The findings of the empirical 
analyses emphasise the role of donor-interest variables, but show that recipient needs play a 
(seemingly subordinate) role in decisions on EU aid allocation. Normative frameworks appear to take 
a back seat to both political donor interests and recipient needs. 
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1. Introduction 
Similar to most other providers of international development assistance, the European Union 
has been subject to the ‘governance turn’ of the late 1990s. Policy documents produced by the 
European Commission and Council around 2000 show a clear embrace of ideas on ‘good 
governance’ that had been produced by the World Bank in the final decade of the previous 
century. As such, the European Union supported the ‘Post-Washington Consensus’ that 
replaced the market fundamentalism of the previous era. 
 Good governance was seen, by the main EU institutions, as a fundamental principle of its 
development policy, in service of the main policy objective: ‘to reduce and, eventually, to 
eradicate poverty’ (European Council and Commission 2000: point 6). Good governance, 
alongside the protection of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, was accorded 
prime importance particularly to enhance the effectiveness of its poverty-reduction efforts. 
As it was phrased in a communication by the European Commission: 
 
Poverty reduction, the main objective of the European Community’s development policy, 
will only be sustainably achieved where there are functioning participatory democracies 
and accountable governments. Corrupt and autocratic governments are likely to misuse 
development assistance either to maintain repression or for private enrichment at the 
expense of their populations. (European Commission 2001b: 4) 
 
Possibly the broadest statement on the issue is given in the European Consensus on 
Development, a landmark document of EU development assistance policy that signalled 
agreement among member states and EU institutions on its basic principles (cf. Carbone 
2007: 55-6). The Consensus referred to the EU’s emphasis of the promotion of ‘common 
values’ in its policies towards third countries, which would be ‘respect for human rights, 
fundamental freedoms, peace, democracy, good governance, gender equality, the rule of law, 
solidarity and justice’ (European Parliament, Council and Commission 2006: C46/3). A more 
recent statement, issued at the launch of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 
January 2011, emphasised the continuity in EU thinking over the first decade of this century. 
At this occasion, David O’Sullivan (2011: 7), Chief Operating Officer of the newly established 
EEAS, indicated that the promotion of human rights and good governance would be ‘the 
silver thread running through everything we do’. 
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 An influential interpretation of the motivations of the European Union revolves around 
the idea of ‘normative power Europe’. The idea that the EU is primarily a normative power 
implies that European relations with other parts of the world are motivated by normative 
ideas concerning democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Critics of the notion of 
normative power Europe point out that the impact of political norms in European external 
relations is limited, and that the norms serve to legitimise political agendas that are 
otherwise determined by political interests.  
 The relative impact of norms and interests on European aid allocations has received 
surprisingly little attention among quantitative researchers, despite the fact that the 
European Union has become a significant provides of foreign assistance. This paper aims to 
assess which factors – normative power, political interest or recipient need – seem to 
influence the allocation of development assistance to the EU’s partner countries in Africa, 
Latin America, Asia and the so-called neighbourhood.  
Previous empirical research on aid allocation has consistently found that governance-
related considerations appear to exert limited to negligible influence on the actual selectivity 
of development assistance (e.g., Neumayer 2003, Hout 2007, Clist 2011). Yet, Gordon 
Crawford in his study on so-called ‘political aid’, reported some impact of political 
selectivity on EU aid allocations, in particular with regard to the promotion of democracy. 
Crawford noted that the EU tended to support, in particular, the strengthening of electoral 
processes and of civil and political rights, while providing less assistance to processes related 
to government accountability and democracy (Crawford 2001: 150-1).  
 The paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses some salient aspects of the 
EU’s development policy and its focus on aspects of ‘good governance’. Section 3 outlines 
the theoretical perspectives and formulates some hypotheses on the allocation of EU aid 
funds. Section 4 discusses the methodology and data used in the paper. Section 5 contains 
the analysis of allocations according to the recent CSPs. The final section formulates some 
conclusions on the allocation of EU development assistance and the debate about aid 
selectivity. 
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2. EU Development Policy and ‘Good Governance’ 
Since the end of the Cold War, European Union development assistance policies have been 
targeting three main ‘arenas’: the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (or ACP) countries; 
the European ‘neighbourhood’; and other developing countries. The first arena consists 
mainly of former colonies of the EU’s member states and has been regulated by a sequence of 
conventions and agreements, named after the African cities where these were concluded: 
Yaoundé (1964-1976), Lomé (1976-2003) and Cotonou (since 2003). Development assistance to 
the ACP group is financed from the European Development Fund (EDF), which contains 
€22.7 billion for the 2008-13 period and is currently in its tenth quinquennial round. The 
second arena includes countries in North Africa, the Mediterranean rim of the Middle East 
and countries that were part of the former Soviet Union and are west of the Ural Mountains 
and in the Caucasus. The financing instrument is the European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI), holding €11.2 billion for the 2007-13 period. The third arena 
is a more or less residual group, consisting of countries in Latin America, Asia and the 
Middle East, plus the Central Asian former Soviet republics and South Africa. Policies for 
this group are currently being financed from the Development Cooperation Instrument 
(DCI), which amounts to €16.9 billion, to be spent from 2007 until 2013. 
The aid relationship between the European Union and partner developing countries is 
structured by the so-called Country Strategy Paper (CSP). The CSP contains the EU’s 
medium-term strategy for the provision of development assistance on the basis of a country’s 
official national policy priorities. The latter have usually been laid down in a Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), required for support from the World Bank and IMF. The 
so-called Multiannual or National Indicative Programme (MIP/NIP) serves as a financial 
operationalisation of the CSP. 
The legal-institutional framework of EU development cooperation changed considerably 
with the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2011. The establishment of the 
position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (who 
also serves as one of the vice-presidents of the European Commission), the creation of the 
European External Action Service and the merger of two separate Directorates-General into 
DG Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid (DEVCO in short) have been the most 
obvious changes in the area of development policy. The restructuring resulted, according to 
5 
 
two analysts, in ‘a complex programming process’ (van Seters and Klavert 2011: 3). The 
European Council decided in July 2010 to reorganise policy-making responsibilities on 
development cooperation by making the EEAS responsible for preparing decision making in 
the Commission on country allocations, CSPs and MIPs (European Council 2010: article 9.3). 
Notwithstanding these responsibilities, the Commissioners for Development and 
Neighbourhood Policy have retained their powers, as ‘any proposals’ on the three 
development instruments that were mentioned above would need to be made jointly by the 
relevant departments of the EEAS and those of DG DEVCO  ‘under the responsibility of the 
Commissioner’ and ‘submitted jointly with the High Representative for adoption by the 
Commission’ (European Council 2010: articles 9.4 and 9.5). 
 Building on an earlier statement of the European Council and the Commission (2000), the 
first major steps toward including a governance dimension in EU development assistance 
were set in 2003. A communication drafted by the European Commission, as well as ensuing 
conclusions formulated by the European Council, stressed the centrality of proper 
governance arrangements to securing positive development outcomes. The Commission, 
which interpreted governance primarily in terms of rules and processes guiding interest 
articulation, resource management and the exercise of power, argued that ‘[the] way public 
functions are carried out, public resources are managed and public regulatory powers are 
exercised is the major issue to be addressed in that context. The real value of the concept of 
governance is that it provides a terminology that is more pragmatic than democracy, human 
rights, etc.’ (European Commission 2003: 3). The Commission and the Council agreed that 
good governance policies should not be ‘one-size-fits-all’, but rather recognised the 
distinction between ‘effective partnerships’ where conventional tools for governance reform 
would be feasible and ‘difficult partnerships and post-conflict situations’ (fragile states) that 
necessitate the adoption of more targeted approaches (European Commission 2003: 18; 
European Council 2003b: 4). 
 In an attempt to operationalise the governance approach adopted by the Council and 
Commission, the EuropeAid Cooperation Office drafted a handbook on promoting good 
governance. The Handbook argued that ‘it is now recognised by all actors that governance, 
i.e. the state’s ability to serve the citizens, is a key component of policies and reforms for 
poverty reduction and that good governance is key to the sustainable achievement of 
6 
 
development objectives and to the effectiveness of development assistance’ (EuropeAid 
Cooperation Office 2004: 5).’ The handbook distinguished six ‘core concerns’ of good 
governance (EuropeAid Cooperation Office 2004: 8): 
 
 democratisation and elections; 
 promotion and protection of human rights; 
 strengthening of the rule of law; 
 enhancement of the role of civil society; 
 reform of public administration, the civil service and public finance management; 
 decentralisation and capacity building of local government.  
 
EuropeAid argued that such core concerns would all warrant attention in their own right, 
but that attention for proper governance would also need to be ‘mainstreamed’. For this to be 
done, the office formulated six ‘guiding principles’ that should be applied in a ‘horizontal’ 
fashion to ensure that ‘all project and programmes, at every phase of their development, 
promote good governance practices’: participation and ownership, equity, organisational 
adequacy, transparency and accountability, conflict prevention, and anti-corruption 
(EuropeAid Cooperation Office 2004: 9-10). 
 The ‘European Consensus on Development’, adopted by the European Council, 
Parliament and Commission in December 2005, contained a reaffirmation of the EU’s 
orientation to governance: the document emphasised the promotion of governance, 
democracy, human rights and support for economic and institutional reforms among the 
EU’s nine central activities, as it argued the Union had a ‘comparative advantage’ in these 
areas (European Parliament, Council and Commission 2006: C46/11, 13-14).3 In this particular 
area,  
 
                                                     
3 The other areas were: trade and regional integration; environment and sustainable management of 
natural resources; infrastructure, communications and transport; water and energy; rural 
development, territorial planning, agriculture and food security; conflict prevention and fragile states; 
human development; and social cohesion and employment (European Parliament, Council and 
Commission 2006: C46/11-15). 
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[t]he Community4 will actively promote a participatory in-country dialogue on 
governance, in areas such as anti-corruption, public sector reform, access to justice and 
reform of the judicial system. … With a view to improved legitimacy and accountability 
of country-driven reforms, the Community will … also support decentralisation and local 
authorities, the strengthening of the role of Parliaments, promote human security of the 
poor, and the strengthening of national processes to ensure free, fair and transparent 
elections. The Community will promote democratic governance principles in relation to 
financial, tax and judicial matters.’ (European Parliament, Council and Commission 2006: 
C46/13-14) 
 
As a follow-up to the European Consensus, the European Commission published a 
communication in which it announced a more ‘incentive-based approach’ to governance in 
the context of its most important development relationship, namely its partnership with the 
group of ACP countries. As part of its so-called ‘Governance Initiative’, the Commission 
introduced a ‘governance incentive tranche’ during the tenth round of the EDF, amounting 
to €2.7 billion, or roughly 12 per cent of the funds made available for the 2008-13 period. The 
funds were distributed as ‘additional financial support to countries adopting or ready to 
commit themselves to a plan that contains ambitious, credible measures and reforms’ 
(European Commission 2006d: 10; European Commission 2009: 3-6). 5 In a similar vein, the 
ENPI for the 2007-10 period contained €50 million for a ‘governance facility’ (European 
Commission 2008b: 5). Of the three main instruments of EU development assistance, the DCI 
was the only one that did not contain an incentive-oriented mechanism; the DCI only 
expressed the intention of mainstreaming the attention for governance, democracy and 
human rights into various thematic programmes (European Parliament and Council 2006: 
L378/46).  
                                                     
4 This terminology stems from the pre-Lisbon constitutional framework, when development 
cooperation, as per the Treaty of Maastricht, was part of the first ‘pillar’ of the European Union, and 
was regulated by title XX, articles 177-181 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community. 
5 (Molenaers and Nijs 2009, Molenaers and Nijs 2011) have presented critical analyses of the 
implementation of the governance incentive tranche. Also, a review done by the European 
Commission (2009: 9-12) highlights some of the difficulties, in particular regarding the size of the 
incentives involved. According to the Commission (2009: 12), ‘the incentive created by the tranche is 
primarily political: encouragement for the partner country to engage in a political dialogue on 
governance and to formalise its political commitment for reform in a “contract”.’ 
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In order to monitor the state and progress of governance reform in partner countries, and 
allocate funds, the Commission established a ‘governance profile’, consisting of nine 
indicators that should enable the establishment of the ‘level’ and ‘trend’ of the performance 
of aid-recipient countries. The profile contains the following elements: political/democratic 
governance, political governance/rule of law, control of corruption, government 
effectiveness, economic governance, internal and external security, social governance, 
international and regional context, and quality of partnership (European Commission 2006a: 
13-29). 
The latest communication on development policy published by the Commission focused 
on ‘development impact’. This communication reiterated the Commission’s focus on human 
rights, democracy and good governance among the EU’s ‘policy priorities’ (European 
Commission 2011: 4-5), while emphasising that EU aid should be directed towards those 
countries with the greatest need for development assistance and countries where aid could 
have the biggest impact, such as fragile states. The communication also stressed ‘incentives 
for results-oriented reform’, for instance by introducing a clearer link to country performance 
with regard to its institutional reforms and policies and by suggesting a connection between 
the allocation of general budget support and a country’s governance situation (European 
Commission 2011: 5, 9-10). 
Arguably in recognition of the fact that democratisation and the protection of human 
rights are not well taken care of by partner governments in the developing world, the EU 
established the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) in 2006. 
The instrument was a follow-up to operations ‘contributing to the general objective of 
developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respecting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms’, started in 1999 (European Council 1999a, 1999b). 
The EIDHR, with an allocation of €472 million for the three-year period from 2011 to 2013, 
aim to support civil-society organisations in organising education, training and research 
activities in the areas of human rights and democratisation, as well as provide support to 
election observation missions (European Commission 2010b: 5, 10, 36). 
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Since the adoption of the European Security Strategy in 2003, fragile states6 have occupied 
a special place in European development policy. The approach to fragile states was a clear 
case of the fusion of the development and security agendas of the European Union 
(European Council 2003a).  State fragility was interpreted, in its operational features, as a 
phenomenon with clear governance overtones. According to the Commission (2007: 8), 
‘[f]ragility is often triggered by governance shortcomings and failures, in form of lack of 
political legitimacy compounded by very limited institutional capacities linked to poverty’. 
In 2007, the European Council requested the Commission to choose a set of pilot countries to 
get experience with the EU response to fragile states. The Commission selected six countries 
(Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Timor-Leste and Yemen), where lessons should 
be learnt for a more comprehensive approach, to be laid down in an Action Plan for Situations 
of Fragility and Conflict (European Commission 2010). To date, the preparation of the action 
plan has not proceeded as expected, as the newly created European External Action Service 
and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy appear to 
have had little direct interest in taking forward the fragile states approach (Castillejo 2011: 
169). 
Since the turn of the century, the European Union has been adopting comprehensive 
‘strategic frameworks’ for the traditional arenas of its development policy that were outlined 
above (Latin America, Asia, Central Asia and the European Neighbourhood), as well as, in 
the case of the ACP, specific sub-regions within the grouping.7 Without exception, these 
documents include statements on the promotion of good governance, usually in the context 
of democratisation, the protection of human rights and strengthening of the rule of law. In 
many cases, regionally specific elements are included in the concept of good governance, 
thereby illustrating the elasticity of the term. The most comprehensive notion of governance 
is represented in the Africa-EU partnership document of 2007, which, apart from the 
                                                     
6 State fragility was defined by the European Council in reference to ‘weak or failing structures and to 
situations where the social contract is broken due to the State’s incapacity or unwillingness to deal 
with its basic functions, meet its obligations and responsibilities regarding the rule of law, protection 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, security and safety of its population, poverty reduction, 
service delivery, the transparent and equitable management of resources and access to power’ 
(European Council 2007b: 2). 
 
7 The latter approach has led some commentators to talk about a ‘regionalisation’ of the EU’s approach 
to the ACP group (van Seters and Klavert 2011: 14).  
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conventional elements, mentions aspects such as gender equality, the management of natural 
resources, human security and corporate social responsibility (European Council 2007a: 8). 
Other dimensions brought under the rubric of good governance include (European 
Commission 2001a: 18; 2005: 8; 2006b: 6, 25; 2006c: 6-10; 2008a: 3, 10; European Commission 
and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2011: 6, 11; European 
Council 2007c: 20, 23; 2010: 20; European External Action Service 2011: 7): 
 
 the strengthening of civil society (Asia, the Caribbean, the Pacific Islands and the 
Mediterranean); 
 taxation and fiscal policy making (Latin America, the Caribbean and the Pacific 
Islands); 
 forestry management (Central Asia and the Pacific Islands); 
 post-conflict reconstruction and conflict resolution (the Pacific Islands and the Sahel); 
 economic reforms (the Mediterranean); 
 the energy sector (Central Asia) 
 financial management (Latin America); 
 fisheries policy (the Pacific Islands); and 
 water governance (Central Asia). 
 
 
3. Theoretical Approaches  
The theory of ‘normative power Europe’ clearly sets the European Union apart from other 
actors in the field of foreign policy and development assistance. This approach, which is 
drawing on some important liberal notions of foreign policy-making, focuses on the 
importance of ideas to development aid policies. In the scholarly literature on aid, Carol 
Lancaster (2007: 18-19) has emphasised that ideas, next to institutions, interests and 
organisations, are among the central domestic political influences on aid giving. According 
to her, ‘worldviews’ (‘widely shared values [based on culture, religion, ideology] about what 
is right and wrong, appropriate and inappropriate in public and private life’) and ‘principled 
beliefs’ or ‘norms’ (‘collective expectations about the proper behavior for a given identity’) 
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are important factors in the shaping of and decision making on foreign aid (Lancaster 2007: 
18).  
 The theory of normative power Europe focuses on the desire to promote democracy, 
human rights and good governance in the developing world with the help of EU aid policies. 
The underlying ideal is that of a liberal-democratic form of government, where the state is 
mainly an impartial arbiter between contending forces that regulates the struggle among 
interests on the basis of well-defined and protected individual rights (cf. Williams 2008: 13-
14, Youngs 2010: 2-4). The concept of ‘normative power Europe’ was coined as an attempt to 
re-interpret the factors motivating the actions of the European Union (the original 
formulation was Manners 2002, a more recent interpretation is Sicurelli 2010: 13-32). 
According to Manners (2002: 242-3) , the acquis communautaire and the acquis politique contain 
five ‘core norms’ (peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms) and four ‘minor norms’ (social solidarity, anti-discrimination, 
sustainable development and good governance). On this basis, he claims that  
 
not only is the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly … this predisposes it 
to act in a normative way in world politics. … Thus my presentation of the EU as a 
normative power has an ontological quality to it – that the EU can be conceptualized as a 
changer of norms in the international system; a positivist quantity to it – that the EU acts 
to change norms in the international system; and a normative quality to it – that the EU 
should act to extend its norms into the international system. (Manners 2002: 252) 
 
 In opposition to the notion of normative power Europe, other scholars have emphasised 
that political interests are shaping EU development assistance policies. Scholars emphasising 
political interests draw on a body of literature on development assistance more generally in 
which ‘donor interests’ are placed centrally. Many studies performed since the end of the 
1970s, including McKinlay and Little’s original work on aid allocation, have reported 
findings pointing at the prevalence of foreign policy interests in the explanation of 
development aid relationships (McKinlay and Little 1979, cf. McKinlay and Little 1978a, 
McKinlay and Little 1978b). Donor interest models relate development assistance, or foreign 
aid more generally, to the foreign policy objectives of a donor government. In this sense, the 
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model draws on classical realist notions of foreign policy making and international politics 
that see aid as one of the instruments of foreign policy. Thus, following the seminal work of 
realist scholar Hans Morgenthau, aid needs to be interpreted as ‘an integral part of the 
political policies of the giving country’ and thus subject to the policy objectives of that 
country (Morgenthau 1962: 309, cf. Packenham 1966). Empirical research on aid has tended 
to include variables on trade relations or colonial ties as indicators of donor interest (e.g., 
Dollar and Levin 2006). 
 In relation to the EU’s development policy, several sets of interests can be seen to 
dominate the discourse regarding the motivations for providing aid. First, as analysed in 
Ravenhill’s classical study on ‘collective clientelism’, the countries of the European 
Community, and later the European Union, have used the benefits provided to the ACP 
countries, concluded at Yaoundé, Lomé and Cotonou, as instruments to maintain their 
influence in the former European colonies (Ravenhill 1985: 324-33). The ACP countries’ 
trading capacities have recently, for instance through the focus on the establishment of 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), received most attention.  
Next to trade interests, security considerations have started to play a role in EU 
development policies, particularly since ‘9/11’. As indicated above, the adoption of the 
European Security Strategy in 2003 (European Council 2003a) was a sign that the European 
Council perceived the danger of state fragility as a potential threat to the security interests of 
the European Union. The reconstruction of state capacities and security sector reform are the 
most important objectives of EU policies.  
A different type of security considerations has entered the discourse on the EU’s 
relationship to its ‘neighbourhood’. Despite the use of this convivial term in reference to the 
countries on the European rim, the issue of migration has been ‘securitised’ in the context of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy, one of the overt aims of which is to reduce illegal 
immigration into the European Union. The enhancement of the security capacity of 
neighbourhood countries was made into a conditionality for EU support through the 
neighbourhood instrument (Kausch and Youngs 2009: 965-8, cf. Buzan et al. 1998: 23-6). 
 Finally, some authors have emphasised the use of development assistance for bringing 
about public sector reform, creating property rights and liberalising and opening up the 
economy as part of the neo-liberal (‘Post-Washington Consensus’) agenda that aims at 
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reorganising, and limiting the role of, the state in the economy of developing countries. This 
interpretation (Williams 2008: 88-9, Craig and Porter 2005: 95-121, Hout and Robison 2009: 2-
5, Hout 2007) has analysed the emphasis on good governance over the past fifteen years as a 
reflection of a more fundamental desire to bringing about market-oriented social 
transformation. Key instruments are seen to be the limiting of the role of the state (by 
liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation of the economy) and the establishment and 
protection of property rights as the main way of supporting citizens’ participation in the 
market. Instead of seeing the normative orientation to political reform in developing 
countries as a sign of moral conviction, analysts do not take the official policy at face value. 
Rather, as in a recent publication on the issue, authors provide ‘a critical assessment of how 
norms can work to rationalise policy agendas which tangibly fall short of their nominal 
ethical objectives’ (Langan 2012: 249). In the same vein, Chandler (2010) has analysed the 
EU’s purposes in its relationship with various countries in South Eastern Europe, which 
aspire EU membership, as a situation of ‘post-liberal governance’. He argued that the EU has 
imposed conditionalities on the states of the Balkans in order to ‘reproduce’ itself in the 
region (Chandler 2010: 80). Similarly, two analysts of the current attention for state building 
have claimed recently that this approach is intimately linked to development and that it can 
be interpreted as ‘the repackaging of a long-term agenda for entrenching neoliberalism as the 
organising principle of developing economies and polities and the furthering of a putative 
“liberal peace”’ (Marquette and Beswick 2011: 1705). 
In addition to the normative power and political interest explanations of EU aid, a third 
explanation can be distinguished, again drawing on McKinlay and Little’s classical work in 
the field. The so-called recipient need model takes a radically different starting point as 
compared to the donor interest approach. Informed by idealist views on international 
politics, models based on recipient need have stressed humanitarian motives related to 
conceptions of international justice and have emphasised that donor countries aim to 
improve the quality of life, in particular of the poor, in developing countries. Poverty 
reduction has generally been taken to be the main response to recipient need, and empirical 
studies have commonly been using gross national income or product per capita as the best 
proxy for the level of poverty (Clist 2011: 1726-8, e.g., Dollar and Levin 2006: 2037). 
Important studies, such as those by Dollar and Levin (2006) and more recently Clist (2011), 
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have found evidence of the influence of recipient needs, but continue to report the influence 
of donor interests, suggesting a much less neat distinction between the two types of 
motivations.  
 
 
4. Research Design and Data 
On the basis of the discussion of differing explanations of development assistance and the 
role of the EU in section 3, it is plausible to assume that the allocation of governance-related 
support by the EU cannot be captured neatly in one explanatory model. The allocation of EU 
assistance for governance is made up of a variety of categories, including: 
 
 aid for improving the business environment; 
 aid for improving the security sector; 
 aid for border control and regulation of migration; 
 aid for public sector reform; 
 aid for political governance (human rights, civil society, elections and formal political 
institutions). 
 
The following analyses test the hypothesis that the different components of governance-
related support can be ranged on a continuum, where political interests are the main 
explanatory factor on one end and normative power is the main explanatory factor on the 
other end. The continuum that is researched can be pictured as follows: 
 
Figure 1 Continuum of Categories of EU Governance-related Assistance 
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The analysis of this paper focuses on one of the three key instruments that the EU has 
available in its ‘tool box for external action’, namely assistance, conditionality and political 
dialogue. This paper relates to the financial assistance provided to 126 countries (see 
Appendices A and B), ranging from middle-income to least developed, that qualify for 
support under the EU’s three main instruments: the European Development Fund (the ACP 
countries), the Development Cooperation Instrument (countries in Latin America, Asia and 
the Middle East) and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (the 
countries on Europe’s southern, eastern and south eastern rim).8 
 Data on EU assistance were obtained from the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) and/or the  
Multi-annual or National Indicative Programme (MIP or NIP) agreed between the European 
Commission and its partner governments. The analysis focuses on the allocations made for 
the period from 2007 to 2013. The reason for opting for an analysis of allocations rather than 
disbursements is that most scholars focusing on assistance agree that the former are 
generally a better approximation of donor intentions than realised payments, since various 
causes may lead to differences between allocations and actual disbursements.9 
 Unclarity or vagueness in the Multi-annual or National Indicative Programmes about 
programme categories implied that, in some cases, additional assumptions needed to be 
made on the allocation of budgets to specific governance activities. In those cases where the 
MIP/NIP mentioned only broad governance categories without specifying the allocations to 
those targeted categories in more detail, allocations were assumed to be spread equally over 
the categories mentioned in the MIP/NIP. For the purpose of the current analyses, data on 
allocations to governance programmes were classified into seven categories of support of, 
respectively, human rights activities; public sector and public administration reform; 
decentralisation and local governance; public finance management; judicial reform and 
support to the justice sector; civil society and non-state actors; and elections and formal 
political institutions.  
                                                     
8 The analysis excludes seven countries for which no Country Strategy Paper or Multi-annual or 
National Indicative Programme was available: Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Guinea, Russia, South Sudan, 
Sudan and Zimbabwe. 
9 The fragmentation and unclarity of allocations under the European Instrument for Democracy and 
Human Rights (EIDHR) have prompted me to leave out this instrument from the ensuing analyses. 
See: European Commission (2012c). 
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Following previous analyses of aid selectivity (e.g., Neumayer 2003; Hout 2007; Clist 
2011), a two-stage model is used to determine the impact of a set of explanatory variables on 
aid eligibility (the first stage) and the level of aid allocations (the second stage). The two 
stages reflect the analytical distinction between two types of decisions regarding the 
allocation of aid: which countries are selected for aid programmes and which are not 
(eligibility stage) and how much aid is allocated to countries that are considered eligible 
(level stage)? Aid eligibility is measured as a binary variable for the various categories of aid 
mentioned above. Aid level is measured as the absolute amount of aid for governance reform 
allocated to recipient countries. Because of the skewed distribution of aid allocation, 
logarithmic transformation was applied to the dependent variables expressing the level of 
aid. 
 The explanatory variables are expressed by a range of indicators, which relate to the 
different theoretical perspectives that were discussed in section 3. In order to assess the 
impact of the notion of normative power Europe, an indicator has been included that 
measures the change in civil and political freedom in the period preceding the EU allocations 
for the 2007-13 period. Political interests are measured by two variables: EU economic 
interest and the change in economic freedom in the period preceding the 2007-13 allocations. 
Average per capita income and Least Developed Country (LDC) status are included as 
proxies for recipient needs. State fragility, ACP group membership, ENPI membership and 
countries’ location in sub-Saharan African are included to assess the impact of specific 
country characteristics. Finally, size of the population is included as a control variable for the 
size of the country. 
Data on the first five indicators have been included for 2007, if available. The final two 
indicators express changes over the five year period preceding the allocation (2003-7). 
Appendix A lists the sources of the indicators: 
 Wealth or poverty level, measured as GDP per capita in purchasing power parity, and 
expressed in constant prices of 2005;  
 EU economic interest, measured as the value of exports in millions of euros; 
 Country size, measured as the size of the population in millions; 
 State fragility, as measured by the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index 2007. The index 
includes 114 out of EU’s 126 partner developing countries (with missing data mainly 
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concerning smaller [island] states). A higher score on the index reflects that a country 
has more characteristics of state fragility.  
 Least Developed Country status, as reported in UNCTAD’s Least Developed Countries 
Report 2007. The criteria for inclusion among the least developed countries are: low 
income (three-year average gross national income per capita below $900), limited 
human assets (measured with indicators on nutrition, health, school enrolment and 
literacy) and economic vulnerability (measured with indicators of natural shocks, trade 
shocks, exposure to shocks, economic smallness and economic remoteness). 
 Change in civil and political freedom, 2003-7, calculated as the absolute change in country 
scores on Freedom House’s political rights and civil liberties index, which ranges 
between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free). 
 Change in economic freedom, 2003-7, calculated as the change in country scores on 
regulatory quality, taken from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. The 
indicator of regulatory quality captures ‘perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development’.  
In order to correct the skewed distribution of the data on income/poverty level, EU economic 
interest and country size, these three variables were entered into the analyses after 
logarithmic transformation. 
 The eligibility and level stages are analysed by performing two variants of regression 
analysis, based on the measurement levels of the dependent variables. The analysis of the 
eligibility stage is performed with logistic regression, while for the level stage ordinary least-
squares regression is applied. The analyses of the level stage include only recipient countries, 
that is, countries that have been included as aid partners at the eligibility stage.  
 
 
5. Analysis of EU Allocation Patterns 
This section reports on the findings of the analysis of allocations to a variety of governance 
instruments in EU external assistance policies in the 2007-13 period. The next two sub-
sections discuss the results of the analysis of the eligibility and level stages. 
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5.1 Eligibility for EU Governance-related Assistance 
Table 1 summarises the findings of the logistic regression analyses related to eligibility for 
EU governance-related assistance. Results are presented for six dependent variables. The 
regression of total governance aid on the set of independent variables serves as a reference 
point for the analysis of other dependent variables, all of which are categories within total 
EU assistance for governance purposes. Each of the analyses starts with the presentation of a 
full model, containing all independent variables that were discussed in the previous section. 
Subsequent estimations relate to reduced models, from which variables have been omitted 
that demonstrated too high levels of multicollinearity. The discussion of the analyses in this 
section focuses on the reduced models (2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12). 
 The analysis of the allocation of total governance aid (equation 2) shows that governance 
aid can be explained moderately well using the model specified here. Overall governance aid 
seems to be a function of a variety of considerations, reflecting the generally held idea in the 
aid allocation literature that donor interest and recipient needs models should be combined. 
The eligibility for governance-related assistance can be understood to a large extent in terms 
of recipient needs, as GDP per capita is the most important explanatory factor. Donor 
political interests appear to be influential alongside the recipient need variable, illustrated by 
the positive impact of the interaction term of ACP group membership and EU trade 
relationships, and the impact of ENPI membership. This finding indicates that ACP group 
members that have a high level of trade with the EU, as well as partners in the European 
Neighbourhood are significantly more frequently represented among recipients of 
governance assistance than other countries. 
 Analysis of the eligibility for assistance to the business environment (equation 4) seems to 
corroborate the impact of political interests on the allocation of aid in support of market-
oriented reform. Countries that had experienced a reform in the regulatory framework of the 
economy in the years preceding the EU allocations for the 2007-13 period, had a significantly 
greater chance to be included in EU aid for business-related reform. The only other 
significant variable in this equation relates to ACP membership, indicating that ACP 
countries generally had a lesser chance of obtaining this form of assistance from the EU. 
 Eligibility for assistance aimed at supporting homeland security and migration controls in 
EU partner countries is quite well explained by the model of equation 6, in that over 91 per 
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cent of the cases is correctly classified. It appears that none of the independent variables, 
with the exception of ENPI membership, exerts any significance influence on eligibility for 
this type of aid. The explanation for the inclusion and exclusion of countries for assistance 
for strengthening border controls and curbing migration flows seems to revolve around 
direct political interests of the European Union related to the protection of its borders. 
 In a similar way, eligibility of assistance for security governance in aid-recipient countries 
seems to be guided by a clear definition of the EU’s political interests. Equation 8 indicates 
that one variable clearly dominates in the explanation of security-sector governance aid. The 
decision to include countries among the recipients of this type of foreign assistance appears 
to be guided primarily by the assessment on the part of the EU of countries’ state fragility. 
The understanding of state fragility as a security problem was highlighted in the discussion, 
in previous sections, of Europe’s security strategy. It is plausible to assume that notions of 
security related to fragile states have continued to cast their shadow over the allocations of 
EU aid in the 2007-13 period. 
 Aid for public sector reform and for political governance were assumed above to 
represent the normative power side of the aid continuum. Equation 10 indicates that the 
normative inspiration may indeed have had some influence in the decision-making on the 
partners the EU has wished to include for support for public sector reform. It is clear that the 
strengthening of civil and political freedom in particular countries has had an important 
influence on the decision to select those countries. As indicated by coefficient related to the 
indicator on GDP per capita, eligibility decisions on public sector support do also seem to 
reflect considerations of recipient needs. Finally, countries in the European Neighbourhood 
appear to have been included among aid recipients with some priority. 
 Decisions on eligibility for political governance assistance (related to allocations for 
human rights, elections and rule of law) seem to have been less clearly influenced by 
normative considerations, given the weak impact of civil and political freedoms. Recipient 
needs appear to have been a clearer guide, as in the case of public sector reform, as well as 
ENPI membership. Further, ACP membership appears to have had a positive influence on 
inclusion among recipients of this category of aid. 
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Table 1  Elibibility for Governance-related Assistance 
 Dependent variable   
 Governance aid (total) Aid for business 
environment 
Aid for homeland security 
and migration controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP/cap (log) −2.87 −2.96*** −.02  −1.86 .18 
Population (log) −.47  1.06  −.49  
EU trade (log)  .71  −1.10  1.02  
Civil and political freedom −1.10* −.98 .39 .43 .16 −.16 
Economic freedom −1.45 −.46 .18 1.15* −.24 −.44 
ACP membership 1.46  −1.35 −.85* −16.64  
ENPI membership 1.76 2.28** 2.01** 1.10 3.03* 1.65* 
Fragile state .08**  .01  −.08* −.04 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.15  1.14  17.85  
Least developed country −.93  −1.78** −.62 .89  
Interaction ACP/EU trade  .77***   6.00 −.12 
Constant 3.44 11.07*** 1.77 .26   
     111 113 
N 111 118 111 122 90.1 91.2 
Correctly classified (per cent) 85.6 79.7 72.1 68.0 .29 .14 
R2 .51 .39 .31 .22 9.49 
(.30) 
6.76 
(.56) 
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2  
(p-value) 
10.56 
 (.23) 
7.37 
(.50) 
4.31 
(.83) 
8.79 
(.36) 
−1.86 .18 
 
Notes:  Variables in columns 2, 4 and 6 have been removed because of high multicollinearity (r>.40). 
  Reported R2 is Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 at eligibility stage, and adjusted R2 at level stage. 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. P-values are given in brackets for the Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 test. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 Dependent variable   
 Aid for security governance Aid for public sector reform Aid for political 
governance 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
GDP/cap (log) −1.40  −3.09* −3.54*** −1.29 −1.77*** 
Population (log) −.73  −1.03  .19  
EU trade (log)  .65  1.24 .37 −.02  
Civil and political freedom .07 .04 −1.48** −1.05* −.25 −.25 
Economic freedom −.03 .70 −.87 −.91 −.95 −.15 
ACP membership −1.72 −1.01* .82  1.27 1.33*** 
ENPI membership −.13  2.33** 2.33** 1.96** 1.89*** 
Fragile state .08*** .11*** .09**  .05*  
Sub-Saharan Africa .45  1.58  .87  
Least developed country −.90  −.30  −.72  
Constant −3.57 −9.42***   .06 5.89*** 
   1.52 12.04***   
N 111 113   111 118 
Correctly classified (per cent) 83.8 85.0 111 118 71.2 70.3 
R2 .26 .27 81.1 76.3 .38 .28 
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2  
(p-value) 
27.67 
(.01) 
8.84 
(.36) 
.59 .45 12.68 
(.12) 
7.53 
(.48) 
 
Notes:  Variables in columns 8, 10 and 12 have been removed because of high multicollinearity (r>.40). 
Reported R2 is Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 at eligibility stage, and adjusted R2 at level stage. 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. P-values are given in brackets for the Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 test. 
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5.2 Level of EU Governance-related Assistance 
Table 2 provides a summary of the analyses on the level of EU governance-related 
allocations. As in the previous sub-section, results are presented on the basis of two model 
specifications.  
 With regard to the allocation of total governance aid, which is the reference point for 
subsequent analyses, the impact of a number of variables is clearly evident. In this analysis, 
as in all subsequent ones related to the level of allocations, population size is an important 
consideration. It is hardly surprising that larger countries tend to receive larger shares of 
governance-related support. The impact on the level of allocations of a set of other variables 
confirms that again a mix of considerations seems to be at play in the decision making on 
aid: the positive impact of sub-Saharan Africa on the allocation signals the importance of 
recipient-need concerns, while both the impact of changes in economic freedom and ENPI 
membership are reflections of political interests in the context of EU decision making. 
 As in the case of the eligibility for business-oriented assistance, the analysis of the 
allocation of funds for the business environment shows a clear bias towards political 
interests. The interaction term of EU trade and ENPI membership in equation 16 leads to the 
conclusion that important trading partners in the European Neighbourhood receive 
significantly more funds for strengthening their business environment than other countries. 
This finding probably reflects the attention, in EU circles, to creating susceptible business 
environments in the neighbouring countries for trade and investment. Interestingly, aid for 
the business environment also seems to be influenced, though rather weakly, by changes in 
civil and political freedom. It is difficult to gauge the implications of this finding, but one 
may surmise that the interrelationship between enabling business environments and political 
stability has influenced allocation decisions in this domain. 
 The analysis of the level of aid for strengthening homeland security and border controls 
(equation 18) leads to a very similar conclusion as the one on eligibility. It appears that ENPI 
membership exerts an overriding influence on allocations to homeland and border 
governance – after all, the ENPI countries are close to the EU’s borders and are generally 
seen as important transmission points for migrants aspiring to enter into the European 
Union. State fragility appears to have a (rather weak) influence next to ENPI membership. 
One assumption regarding the influence of this variable could be that fragile states are seen 
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as potential sources of migrants, and thus have a strategic similarity with the countries of the 
European Neighbourhood . 
 While the logic of eligibility for security-sector governance could be understood primarily 
in the attention for the security threats emanating from fragile states, the level of allocations 
for security governance cannot be interpreted along the same lines. Overall, the model 
specified in equation 20 has a very low R2 value, and only the control variable of country size 
appears to have a significant influence. 
 Aid levels for public sector reform and for political governance (equations 22 and 24) tend 
to reflect a mixture of political interest and recipient-need factors. Decisions on assistance to 
the public sector and political governance programmes appear to be influenced primarily by 
ENPI membership. Support to public sector reform programmes seems to reflect the political 
interests of the European Union, which prefers that the Neighbourhood countries put their 
political house in order to be stable and effective partners. To a lesser extent, recipient 
countries’ needs seem to play a role in allocation decisions. This factor is expressed in the 
impact of per capita GDP on public sector assistance and of Least Developed Country status 
on political governance support.  
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Table 2  Level of Governance-related Assistance 
 Dependent variable   
 Governance aid (total) Aid for business 
environment 
Aid for homeland security 
and migration controls 
 (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
GDP/cap (log) –.04  –.51 –.17   
Population (log) .26 .24*** .16 .41***  .27* 
EU trade (log)  –.07  .15    
Civil and political freedom –.09 –.15 –.32** –.22*  –.11 
Economic freedom .55* .69** –.30 –.18   
ACP membership .21  –.03    
ENPI membership 1.04*** .91*** .47*   .68*** 
Fragile state .01 .01 –.00   .02* 
Sub-Saharan Africa .17 .39*** .12    
Least developed country .28  –.33    
Interaction EU trade-ENPI 
membership 
   .17***   
Constant –.27 –.10 2.62* 1.38**  –1.10 
       
N 86 87 47 51  10 
R2 .43 .42 .42 .53 n/a .78 
F value 7.30*** 11.48*** 4.36*** 12.40*** n/a 9.12** 
 
Notes:  Variables in columns 14, 16 and 18  have been removed because of high multicollinearity (r>.40). 
Reported R2 is Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 at eligibility stage, and adjusted R2 at level stage. 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. P-values are given in brackets for the Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 test. 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 Dependent variable   
 Aid for security governance Aid for public sector reform Aid for political 
governance 
 (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
GDP/cap (log) .55 .10 –.17 –.24* .51*  
Population (log) .39 .25** .37** .37*** .53*** .45*** 
EU trade (log)  –.32  .05  –.02  
Civil and political freedom –.22 –.14 –.06 –.08 .06 .04 
Economic freedom .01 –.23 .44 .35 .31 .06 
ACP membership –.33  .19  .21  
ENPI membership –.20  .69*** .63*** .75*** .66*** 
Fragile state –.00  –.00  .00  
Sub-Saharan Africa .51  –.04  .11  
Least developed country –.14  .08  .54*** .32*** 
Constant .11 .73 1.18 1.61*** –1.87 .21** 
       
N 24 25 74 75 69 75 
R2 n/a .12 .41 .45 .54 .63 
F value .52 1.79 6.11*** 13.08*** 8.76*** 25.68*** 
 
Notes:  Variables in columns 20, 22 and 24 have been removed because of high multicollinearity (r>.40). 
  Reported R2 is Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 at eligibility stage, and adjusted R2 at level stage. 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. P-values are given in brackets for the Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 test.  
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6. Conclusions 
This paper has attempted to provide an interpretation of the ‘governance turn’ that is 
witnessed in the development policies adopted by the European Union during the first 
decade of this century, more in particularly since the adoption of the ‘European Consensus 
on Development’. Governance reform, captured in the notion of ‘good governance’ was 
shown to be an important element in the EU’s policies on poverty reduction across the 
developing world. 
 The discussion of the evolution of notions of good governance and development at the 
level of the European Union demonstrated that the quality of governance in countries was 
seen to be a vital (co-)determinant of development outcomes. Governance, according to a 
handbook published by the EuropeAid Cooperation Office in 2004, relates to at least six main 
dimensions: democratisation and elections, human rights, the rule of law, the role of civil 
society, public sector reform and public finance management, and decentralisation and local 
government. In relation to the assumed impact of good or bad governance on development 
processes, the EU felt that the allocation of a substantial part of its development budget 
would be warranted to foster positive change in developing countries. 
 The focus of this paper has not been on the level of policy formulation, but rather on the 
allocation of funds through the EU’s main policy instruments: the European Development 
Fund for countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, the European Neighbourhood 
Partnership and Instrument for countries on the southern, eastern and south eastern ‘rim’ of 
the European Union, and the Development Cooperation Instrument for countries in Latin 
America, Asia and the Middle East. The central research question of the paper was whether 
any dominant explanation, or combination of explanations, provided in the literature on 
development assistance, would be able to account for the distribution of over €50 billion in 
assistance provided by the European Commission over the 2007-13 period. Three sets of 
explanations have been placed centrally: donor interest models, recipient need 
interpretations and the theory of normative power Europe. 
The empirical analysis in the second half of the paper involved an estimation of various 
models, using logistic regression for the eligibility stage and OLS for the level stage of aid 
allocations by the European Union. The variables used in the models were derived from 
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three main theoretical perspectives on aid giving: the theory of normative power Europe, the 
donor interest model and the recipient need perspective. 
The empirical analyses reported in this paper lead to the conclusion that the concept of 
normative power Europe has only limited relevance for the explanation of European aid 
allocations in the 2007-13 period. The key variable reflecting this concept appeared to play a 
major role only in one of the six model estimations at the eligibility stage, and one of the 
estimations at the level stage. Political interests seemed to play a far greater role in the 
explanations, as variants of interests were among the main effects at both the eligibility and 
level stages. Recipient needs turned out to be important mainly at the eligibility stage, 
implying that the level of development of partner countries plays an important role in the 
selection process initiated by the European Commission.  
Donor interests have been the red thread running through all the different aid modalities 
implemented by the European Union in the period under analysis. These interests seem to 
have taken different forms in different programmes. The focus on the countries of the 
European Neighbourhood stood out in many analyses, both at the eligibility and the level 
stage. ENPI membership appeared to be among the major explanatory variables both for the 
choice of partners and the level of allocations in relation to total governance aid, homeland 
security and migration, assistance for public sector reform and political governance. 
Economic interests, operationalised as trade relations between the EU and developing 
countries, have been found to be associated with the choice of aid recipients in relation to 
overall governance aid. Improvements in regulatory quality appeared to play its expected 
role in the allocation of aid for the improvement of the business environment, both at the 
eligibility and the level stage. The decision to include countries in EU programmes for 
security sector reform appeared to be influenced to an important extent by state fragility.  
It would be one-sided, however, if the account of EU aid programmes were limited to a 
discussion of donor interests. Considerations of recipient needs do also appear clearly in EU 
development assistance frameworks, although they often seem to take a back seat to 
economic and political interests. Analyses show that per capita income, least developed 
country states and location in sub-Saharan Africa played a role in explanations of total 
governance aid, aid for public-sector reform and political governance programmes, but 
always in conjunction with donor interest variables. 
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Finally, the variables that were used to test the impact of normative frameworks on the 
selection of countries for aid programmes and the specific allocation patterns, did not lend 
much support to explanations of EU aid allocation centred on the concept of normative 
power Europe. The indicator of civil and political freedom played only a marginal role in the 
explanations of EU development assistance, and was found to be significant only in the case 
of eligibility for aid for public-sector reform. 
The current paper set out to analyse whether explanatory models of development 
assistance, formulated primarily for application to bilateral donors, would work in the 
context of EU aid. This paper seems to demonstrate that similar logics can be applied to the 
EU as to other donors. More work needs to be done, particularly for analysing the impact of 
ideas and normative frameworks on EU aid. 
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Appendix A: Countries and data 
 
Countries in the analysis 
The analyses in the paper include all countries (1) with a relationship with the European Union under 
one of the three development-related instruments: the European Development Fund (EDF), the 
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument (ENPI) for the 2007-13 period, and (2) with a Country Strategy Paper. 
The following 126 countries met the criteria and were included in the analyses: Afghanistan, 
Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, The Bahamas, Bangladesh, 
Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, People’s Republic of China, Colombia, 
the Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, The 
Philippines, Rwanda, Samoa, São Tomé e Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, 
Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and The Grenadines, 
Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia. 
 
Aid data 
Data on the allocations of EU aid to recipient countries were obtained from CSPs and MIPs/NIPs for 
the countries mentioned above, through the website of the DG Development and Cooperation–
EuropeAid (European Commission 2012e) or the European External Action Service (2012). 
 
Other data: definitions and sources 
ACP group membership: Source: European Commission (2012a and 2012b).  
ENPI membership: Source: European Commission (2012d). 
State fragility: Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index 2007. Source: Fund for Peace (2007). 
Wealth/poverty level: GDP per capita in purchasing power parity, 2007, constant prices (2005 
international dollars). Source: World Bank (2012), series NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD. 
Country size: Population in millions. Source: World Bank (2012), series SP.POP.TOTL. 
EU economic interest: EU27 exports in millions of euros (2007). Source: Eurostat (2012). 
Least Developed Country status: Source: UNCTAD (2007: iii).  
Change in civil and political freedom: The absolute change in average scores on the political rights and 
civil liberties index between 2003 and  2007. Source: Freedom House (2012). 
Change in economic freedom: The absolute change in the average score for regulatory quality between 
2003 and 2007. Source: World Bank (2011). 
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Appendix B: EU aid allocations under 10th EDF, ENPI or DCI, 2007-13 
 2007-10 2011-13 2007/8-13 Total 
Afghanistan 610.0 600.0  1210.0 
Algeria 220.0 172.0  392.0 
Angola   214.0 214.0 
Antigua and Barbuda   3.4 3.4 
Argentina   65.0 65.0 
Armenia 98.4 157.3  255.7 
Azerbaijan 92.0 122.5  214.5 
Bahamas   4.7 4.7 
Bangladesh 205.0 198.0  403.0 
Barbados        0.2 0.2 
Belarus       – 56.7  56.7 
Belize          11.8 11.8 
Benin           334.0 334.0 
Bhutan        8.0 6.0  14.0 
Bolivia       134.0 115.0  249.0 
Botswana        73.0 73.0 
Brazil        39.65 21.35  61.0 
Burkina Faso    529.0 529.0 
Burundi         188.0 188.0 
Cambodia        152.0 152.0 
Cameroon        239.0 239.0 
Cape Verde      51.0 51.0 
Central African Republic   137.0 137.0 
Chad            299.0 299.0 
Chile           41.0 41.0 
China         128.0   128.0 
Colombia      104.0 59.0  163.0 
Comoros         45.0 45.0 
Congo, Democratic Republic   514.0 514.0 
Congo, Republic   85.0 85.0 
Cook Islands    3.0 3.0 
Costa Rica      34.0 34.0 
Cuba          – 20.0  20.0 
Djibouti        40.5 40.5 
Dominica        5.7 5.7 
Dominican Republic   179.0 179.0 
Ecuador       75.0 66.0  141.0 
Egypt         558.0 449.3  1,007.3 
El Salvador   72.6 48.4  121.0 
Eritrea         122.0 122.0 
Ethiopia        644.0 644.0 
Gabon           49.0 49.0 
Gambia          76.0 76.0 
Georgia       120.4 180.3  300.7 
Ghana           367.0 367.0 
Grenada         6.0 6.0 
Guatemala     87.9 47.1  135.0 
Guinea-Bissau   100.0 100.0 
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Guyana          51.0 51.0 
Haiti           291.0 291.0 
Honduras      127.5 95.5  223.0 
India         260.0 210.0  470.0 
Indonesia     248.0 200.0  448.0 
Iraq          65,8 58.7  124,5 
Israel        8.0 6.0  14.0 
Ivory Coast     218.0 218.0 
Jamaica         110.0 110.0 
Jordan        265.0 223.0  488.0 
Kenya           383.0 383.0 
Kiribati        12.7 12.7 
Laos          33.0 36.0  69.0 
Lebanon       187.0 150.0  337.0 
Lesotho         136.0 136.0 
Liberia         150.0 150.0 
Libya          60.0  60.0 
Madagascar      577.0 577.0 
Malawi          436.0 436.0 
Malaysia        17.0 17.0 
Maldives      4.0 6.0  10.0 
Mali            533.0 533.0 
Marshall Islands   5.3 5.3 
Mauritania      156.0 156.0 
Mauritius       51.0 51.0 
Mexico          55.0 55.0 
Micronesia      8.3 8.3 
Moldova       209.7 273.1  482.8 
Mongolia      14.0 15.0  29.0 
Morocco       654.0 580.5  1,234.5 
Mozambique      622.0 622.0 
Myanmar       65.0 33.0  98.0 
Namibia         103.0 103.0 
Nauru           2.7 2.7 
Nepal         60.0 60.0  120.0 
Nicaragua     114.4 99.6  214.0 
Niger           458.0 458.0 
Nigeria         677.0 677.0 
Niue            3.0 3.0 
Pakistan      200.0 198.0  398.0 
Palau           2.9 2.9 
Panama        14.5 23.5  38.0 
Papua New Guinea     130.0 130.0 
Paraguay      64.0 53.0  117.0 
Peru          85.8 49.2  135.0 
Philippines   61.0 69.0  130.0 
Rwanda          290.0 290.0 
Samoa           30.0 30.0 
São Tomé e Principe   17.1 17.1 
Senegal         288.0 288.0 
Seychelles      5.9 5.9 
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Sierra Leone    242.0 242.0 
Solomon Islands   13.2 13.2 
Somalia         212.0 212.0 
South Africa    980.0 980.0 
Sri Lanka     52.0 60.010  112.0 
St Kitts and Nevis   4.5 4.5 
St Lucia        8.1 8.1 
St Vincent and The Grenadines   7.8 7.8 
Suriname        19.8 19.8 
Swaziland       63.0 63.0 
Syria         130.0 129.0  259.0 
Tanzania        555.0 555.0 
Thailand      8.0 9.0  17.0 
Timor-Leste     63.0 63.0 
Togo            123.0 123.0 
Tonga           5.9 5.9 
Trinidad and Tobago   25.5 25.5 
Tunisia       300.0 240.0  540.0 
Tuvalu          5.0 5.0 
Uganda          439.0 439.0 
Ukraine       494.0 470.0  964.0 
Uruguay         31.0 31.0 
Vanuatu         21.6 21.6 
Venezuela       40.0 40.0 
Vietnam       160.0 144.0  304.0 
Yemen         60.0 –11  60.0 
Zambia          475.0 475.0 
 
                                                     
10 The 2011-13 period has not been considered for Sri Lanka, as no Multiannual Indicative Programme 
seemed to be available for the period beyond 2010. 
11 The 2011-13 period has not been considered for Yemen, as no Multiannual Indicative Programme 
seemed to be available for the period beyond 2010. 
